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George H. W. Bush and the Semi-
Institutional Vice Presidency 
Jack Lechelt 
University of South Carolina 
While serving as Vice President in the two Reagan Ad-
ministrations , George H. W. Bush was actively involved 
in the formulation and execution of foreign policy . Bush's 
prominent profile and contributions were made possible , 
in part , by th e recently augmented reso urces , influence 
and prestige of his office , here termed the semi-
institutionalization of the vice presidency. This article 
briefly recounts the origins, describes the nature , and by 
examining the conduct of Bush , explains the significance, 
of this ph enomenon . 
This article examines the roles played by George Herbert Walker Bush in the area of foreign policy while Vice President during the two Reagan Administrations. 1 I will 
show that his substantial activities and significant contribu-
tions were made possible, in 110 small part, by the recently aug-
mented resources , influence, and prestige of his office, which I 
term the "semi-institutional vice presidency." This institutional 
development has resulted from a number of factors, most signifi-
cantly the increasing complexity of the international environ-
ment, the growth of the presidency, and the establishment of 
1 Three biographical sources offer thorough discussions of Bush's life and political ca-
reer. 1l1e most laudatory comes from Bush's 1988 presidential campaign autobiography, 
looking Fo,ward. A more critical examination is offered by Bob Woodward and Walter 
Pincus in an occasional series of five articles for the Washington Post 's I 988 election 
coverage; the series is titled "George Bush: Man and Politician," and ran from August 7 
to August 11. Retrieved February 11, 2004 from LexisNexis. See also Herbert Parmet's 
balanced biography, George Bush: The life of a lone Star Yankee (200 1). 
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precedents between President Jimmy Carter and Vice President 
Walter Mondale. These precedents have increased the likelihood 
that vice presidents will work in close proximity to their presi-
dents, take on more important assignments, and have more influ-
ence over foreign policy. 
Even with these changes, the vice presidency remains unique. 
Statutory guidance for the office is minimal, and it does not have 
a significant bureaucracy attached to it. The qualifying prefix in 
the term "semi-institutional vice presidency" acknowledges this 
uniqueness, and also recognizes two limits on the full-fledged 
institutionalization of the office.2 These limitations are impor-
tant, but should not be exaggerated. The first is that presidents 
have options in determining how they will utilize their vice 
presidents. It is unlikely, however, that modem Presidents would 
completely ignore their Vice Presidents, if only because, as 
Ronald Reagan rhetorically asked, "Why .. .let able-bodied man-
power sit by?"3 Rather than consider if presidents will use their 
vice presidents, presidents are increasingly likely to consider 
how they will use them. The second limitation is that vice presi-
dents can help or hurt their standings within an administration. 
Of course, this is also true for every Cabinet official and staff 
member. However, unlike Cabinet members and staff, there is no 
mechanism for a president to fire a vice president. 4 More impor-
2 Referring to the presidency, Ragsdale and Theis (1997, 1280) wrote that " institutionali-
zation ... involves the process by which the office as an organization attains stability and 
value as an end in itself. Stability denotes that the entity cannot be easily altered or elimi-
nated, while value involves the entity acquiring a distinctive identity ." Although the vice 
presidency approaches this definition of institutionalization, it cannot acquire levels of 
stability and value that the presidency possesses. 
3 Reagan, R. 1988. Interview by Lou Cannon. Washington Post . Retrieved June 4, 2005 
from LexisNexis. 
• Vice presidents can be impeached and removed from office by Congress, but the presi-
dent has no role in this procedure ; on the other hand, presidents can seek to remove a vice 
president from the ticket in a re-election campaign . 
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tantly, vice presidents are ordinarily motivated to serve their 
presidents well. Indeed, they are often eager to reach the presi-
dency and, recognizing that presidents are titular heads of their 
party and can have a large impact on nominations, vice presi-
dents are motivated both to perform well in office and avoid be-
coming a nuisance to the man most responsible for their career 
ambitions. In light of this, George Bush worked hard to attain 
and maintain a positive relationship with Ronald Reagan, a fact 
particularly evident in Bush's performance in response to the 
assassination attempt on Reagan. 
As we will see, George Bush's tenure as vice president serves 
as a useful case study for the semi-institutional vice presidency. 
Unlike Mondale, Bush competed for his party's presidential 
nomination against the president he ended up serving. Further-
more , Bush hailed from the moderate wing of the Republican 
Party, whereas Reagan was closely aligned with the conservative 
wing. Finally, Reagan had a number of close confidantes who 
either followed him from his home state of California or had 
proven themselves staunch coP.servatives. Given the recent com-
petition between the two men and their ideological (and other) 
differences, the fact that Bush was as active as he was in the 
Reagan administration provides striking evidence for the impor-
tance of the recently developed semi-institutionalization of the 
office. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
SEMI- INSTITUTIONAL VICE PRESIDENCY 
More distant factors in the development of the semi-
institutional vice presidency concern the increasing complexity 
of the international system and the consequent effects it has had 
on the presidency. Edward Morse (1970) provides a useful ac-
count of this complexity , pointing out, for instance, that high pol-
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icy issues such as national security and military matters have 
become increasingly intermingled with low policy issues like 
trade and economic policies. In addition, the distinction between 
foreign and domestic policy has weakened, leading to what one 
scholar has termed " intermestic affairs" (Manning 1977). As a 
result of such developments, the ability of presidents to control 
events became increasingly attenuated and this, in turn, contrib-
uted to the rise of the primacy of the presidency, especially in 
foreign affairs (Manning 1977). Yet the rising prominence and 
power of presidents has had the paradoxical effect of making it 
more difficult for them to handle all of their responsibilities. 
Given their desire to steer policy in their preferred direction and 
to control the bureaucracy, presidents have looked for help wher-
ever they could find it. The vice presidency was a logical place 
for them to turn.5 
Added to these larger environmental factors were the more 
recent events of the Vietnam War and Watergate, and the presi-
dency of Jimmy Carter. As a candidate for the office, Carter's 
status as a Washington outsider proved advantageous against the 
background of these recent national traumas. But neither that 
status, nor his lack of national experience, would serve Carter 
well once in office. To his credit, Carter recognized his dearth of 
Washington experience, and he intended to make up for it with 
the vice presidency: "I had made only one early decision about 
the Vice President-that it was important for me to choose a 
member of Congress as my running mate in order to provide 
some balance of experience to our ticket. Without ever having 
s Many years ago, Paul T. David (I 967, 721) recognized the likelihood of presidents 
turning to their vice presidents : "the increasing recognition of the Vice Presidency re-
flects the hazards of the present world situation , in which the Vice President may be 
called upon at any time to take over as commander -in-chief, as well as the growing bur-
dens on the time and strength of the President as chief executive, leader of his political 
party, and chiefof state ." 
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served in Washington myself, I needed someone who was famil-
iar with the federal government and particularly with the legisla-
tive branch" (Carter, 1982, 35). 
From that decision and the eventual selection of Walter Mon-
dale, a Senator from Minnesota, as Carter's running mate, Carter 
and Mondale agreed on key components of the new vice presi-
dency. These new components, or precedents, were followed by 
all of their successors. First, the vice president was going to have 
an office in the West Wing of the White House, on the assump-
tion that proximity to the president is power. Second, the vice 
president would have weekly private lunches with the president: 
no formal agendas, no other staff. Third, the vice president 
would be included in all paperwork loops, outgoing from the 
president and incoming to the president. Fourth, the vice presi-
dent would be allowed to attend any meeting he wanted to at-
tend. Fifth, no specific tasks or commissions would be forced on 
the vice president; he would be a general advisor to the presi-
dent. Sixth, to secure these ambitious goals, the vice president 
would be given a budget line-item and the necessary staffing. 
These changes to the office of the vice presidency were monu-
mental, particularly for an office once described by a former oc-
cupant, John Nance Gamer , as not being worth a bucket of spit. 
The establishment of precedents is important for understand-
ing much that occurs in and around the presidency, including the 
vice presidency. Cass Sunstein has compared such precedents, or 
"practices," to the changing common law judicia l interpretations 
of the Constitution, contending that the presidency has become 
more prominent over the years based on this sort of change. His 
point is that "common law constitutionalism occurs outside the 
judiciary. The development of these practices and understandings 
resembles the process of common law development. It is recog-
nized that a certain practice 'works'; Congress and the President 
endorse the practice; and the practice therefore operates as a 
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guide for the future" (Sunstein, 1995, 15). Joel K. Goldstein 
( 1995, 560) has applied the point to the vice presidency: "Once 
one President gives his Vice President a weekly private appoint-
ment . . . it becomes difficult for other Presidents not to follow 
suit. These practices when repeated once or twice create settled 
expectations." Paul David (1967, 721) has similarly observed 
that the "functions, duties, and prerogatives of vice presidents 
are not likely to expand without presidential authorization, but 
once the authorization has been granted, it is more difficult to 
withdraw the grant of expanded prerogatives." Since Carter and 
Mondale, the practices discussed here have been repeated four 
times, by Reagan-Bush, Bush-Quayle, Clinton-Gore, and Bush-
Cheney. 
Carter and Mondale left office after four years in an embar-
rassing defeat to another Washington outsider, Ronald Reagan. 
The two presidents, Carter and Reagan, could hardly have been 
more different politically or as managers. Carter was a hands-on 
devourer of detail; Reagan, in contrast, delegated many impor-
tant tasks. Despite his desire to change many government proc-
esses , Reagan continued the Carter-Mondale precedents with his 
own vice president, George Bush. Bush also wanted to follow 
the "Mondale Model" of the newly-enhanced vice presidency. 
"My conclusion," he said after examining the Mondale experi-
ence, "is that the Mondale model is a very good model."6 In fact, 
Bush credited Carter and Mondale with making the important 
changes that he, Bush , benefited from (Smith, 1981, 28).7 In de-
ciding to carry on the Carter-Mondale model, Reagan and Bush 
reinforced the semi-institutionalization of the vice presidency. 
6 Rosenbaum, D. E. 1981. "Bush Plans to Emulate Mondale Role," New York Times, 28 
October, p. B-3. 
7 Smith, H. 1981. "Bush says he Sought to Avoid Acting like Surrogate President," New 
York Times, 12 April, pp. I & 28. 
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THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 
Perhaps no president in modern American history is more dif-
ficult to understand than Ronald Reagan. His inner thoughts and 
feelings and the degree to which he allowed himself to be influ-
enced by those around him have baffled many peop1e.8 Pulitzer 
Prize-winning biographer Edmund Morris (1999, 579), person-
ally picked by Reagan to write his biography, was granted a great 
deal of access to him and still found that Reagan "remained a 
mystery." Specific aspects of Reagan's management style also 
make understanding his presidency difficult. First, Reagan dele-
gated extensively, believing that delegation was "the cornerstone 
of good management: Set clear goals and appoint good people to 
help you achieve them" (Reagan, 1990, 161). But clarity was not 
always achieved; as Martin Anderson (1988, 291) noted, "Be-
cause [Reagan did] not actively and constantly search out and 
demand things, he must rely on what is or is not brought to him." 
Second, Reagan's less-than-direct means of discussing the spe-
cifics of important foreign policy positions often caused friction 
among staff. In dealing with such weighty issues as Central 
America, the Middle East, and the Soviet Union, there always 
appeared to be two different schools or teams fighting each other 
for control of policy. One team represented the California con-
servatives, normally considered to be closer to Reagan's heart.9 
On the other side were pragmatic/realist/moderates often strug-
gling to claim they represented Reagan's best interests, if not his 
8 Lou Cannon (2000 , 144), in the single most useful and authoritative book on the Reagan 
presidency. wrote the following : "While Reagan was still in the White House , dismissed 
or disenchanted former members of his Cabinet and staff produced ten memoirs that 
renect the frustrations of those who made the mistake of trying to breach the personal 
barrier ... [T]he memoirs find Reagan a puzzlement. " 
9 The conservatives included Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, National Security 
Advisor William Clark , Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, and United Na-
tions Ambassador Jeane i(irkpatrick . 
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true desires: George Bush hailed from that camp. 10 Because 
Reagan failed to resolve or even oversee these factions and con-
flicts, it is often hard to discern his foreign policy goals and pri-
orities. 
Added to the difficulties of understanding the Reagan presi-
dency was Bush's preference for keeping his personal views as 
vice president to himself. Bush believed that the advice he gave 
to the president should be shared with no one. 11 No doubt this 
stance helped Bush retain Reagan's confidence; however, it 
makes understanding their relationship more difficult. 
Although Bush had impressive foreign policy credentials, es-
pecially compared to Reagan's limited experience with interna-
tional affairs, Bush had reason to wonder if he was going to be 
accepted into Reagan's inner sanctum. Reagan and Bush ended 
up on the same ticket after initially opposing each other in a 
fairly long and acrimonious fight for the 1980 GOP nomination 
(Untermeyer, 1997, 157). If any president and vice president 
were likely to have difficulties working together, it would be 
Reagan and Bush-and Reagan would not be the one kept out of 
the loop. Yet Reagan held no grudge and accepted Bush into the 
team. One important component of Reagan's personality, as 
noted by Martin Anderson (1998 , 288), was his "inherent humil-
ity": "he [was] not an arrogant or haughty man." 12 
10 Those in the pragmatic camp included Secretary of State George Shultz, National Se-
curity Adviser [NSAJ Robert Mcfarlane , Chief of Staff James Baker, Deputy Chief of 
Staff Michael Deaver , and First Lady Nancy Reagan . Shultz became Secretary of State in 
1982 after Alexand er Haig resigned . McFarlane was one of six NSAs , but he was an 
important part of U.S.-Soviet policy and Iran-Contra . 
11 Chapters nine and ten of Bush 's (1988) autobiography deal with his positions on advis-
ing the President. Herbert Parmet (200 I, 258) wrote about the difficulties of understand-
ing Bush's vice presidency : "The last place to learn about the Bush-Reagan relationship 
would be by listening to George Bush ." 
12 Any difficulties Bush suffered within the Administration came not from Reagan, but 
from his tightly knit conservative associate s. After one successful trip to Europe in 1983, 
and just prior to another trip to Europe in the summer of that same year , conservatives 
Note continues on next page . 
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By maintaining the precedents established by Carter/Mondale, 
Reagan and Bush were able to build a stronger relationship. 
Their weekly lunches, according to Bush's national security ad-
viser, Donald Gregg, gave them the opportunity to get to know 
each other: they enjoyed each other's sense of humor and there 
was a great deal of mutual respect (D. Gregg, personal commu-
nication June 3, 2005). Moreover, Bush's office in the West 
Wing helped ensure that he kept in close contact with the Presi-
dent personally and through the flow of information coming 
from and going to the President. 
Reagan made another decision that enhanced Bush's pros-
pects by choosing James Baker ill to be the White House chief 
of staff. This Reagan did despite the fact that Baker was Bush's 
presidential campaign chief-against Reagan in the 1980 GOP 
primaries. Moreover, Bush and Baker were both from Texas and 
close friends. Although the California conservatives distrusted 
Baker, Reagan's appointment of him as the new chief of staff 
allowed the Vice President to have an additional channel to the 
President. 13 In addition, Bush was well-respected by Deputy 
Chief of Staff Michael K. Deaver, perhaps Reagan's closest as-
sistant.14 Bush also made a helpful staff choice: in 1985, Craig 
were rein forcing the notion that Bush was not a true conservative. At the time, rumors 
spread that Reagan might not run for reelection . Even with the critiques from the right, 
many recognized that Bush would be the nominee in place of Reagan . Reagan made sure 
the conservatives recognized Bush 's importance by declaring at a political event that 
"when I needed someone of unquestionable leadership , loyalty and skill there is only one 
person I could or would choose again, and that 's my partner and your Vice President , 
George Bush" (Gailey, P. I 983 . "A Star who shines brightly in Reagan 's Shadow ," New 
York Times. Retrieved June 6, 2005 from LexisNexis). 
13 Lou Cannon (2000 . 267) wrote that Baker and Bush "oflen worked in concert "- and 
this included work on foreign policy. 
14 Deaver occupied a position far closer to the President than anyone save Nancy Reagan . 
Deaver was one-third of the "troika" tliat worked most closely with President Reagan 
throughout his first term (Baker and Meese made up the other two-thirds) . According to 
Note continue s on next page. 
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Fuller became Bush's vice presidential chief of staff. Fuller had 
long ties to Reagan, stretching back to 1973, and even longer ties 
to Michael Deaver. 15 Fuller was included in top staff meetings 
and maintained close contact with Reagan's second chief of staff, 
Donald Regan. 16 
To handle the large workload that confronts all presidents, 
Reagan believed that Cabinet government was going to be his 
best organizational management model. The idea that the Presi-
dent serves as a chairman of the board over a system that can 
carry out the decisions of the chief decision-maker has likely 
been the hope of every president; the reality, however, dictates a 
much more difficult process. To better enable the Cabinet to op-
erate efficiently, Reagan aide Ed Meese created "Cabinet coun-
cils," which were smaller policy-focused Cabinet sub-sets. 
Reagan was the chairman of all councils and Bush, Meese, and 
Baker were "ex officio members of every council" (Anderson, 
1988, 230). 11 Anderson (1988, 230) describes the Cabinet coun-
cils as ''the main policy chokepoint, a place where new ideas 
could be introduced, good ideas encouraged, and bad ideas 
sunk." Although this Cabinet council system dealt mostly with 
domestic pol icy, Reagan's domestic political staff was often 
heavily involved in foreign policy. And Reagan's extensive use 
of delegating was actually more evident in foreign policy, where 
he gave experts a freer hand than he did with domestic policy 
(Anderson, 1988, 306-7; 309). 
Deaver (1987, 94) Bush was a "class person" and Deaver ' s preference for the vice presi-
dential nomination. 
15 Boyd, G. M. 1985. "Craig L. Fuller, the Vice President ' s New Right-hand Man," New 
York Times. Retrieved June 6, 2005 from LexisNexis . 
16 Ibid . 
17 Anderson adds that "Bush, Meese, and Baker rarely attended the meetings of the Cabi-
net councils unless the discussions reached a fairly critical stage. They largely left it to 
me to represent the president's views during the discussions ." 
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Martin Anderson (1988, 312) credits Richard Allen, Reagan's 
first national security adviser, as "the most important player in 
the formulation and shaping of Reagan 's early foreign policy." 
Anderson went on to list the' traditional" members of Reagan's 
first foreign policy "directorate," which included Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, 
and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey. Also in-
cluded in the directorate were United Nations Ambassador 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Ed Meese, Jim Baker, Michael Deaver , and 
Vice President George Bush. Anderson (1988 , 313) states that 
Reagan drew "Bush deep into the inner sanctums, virtually let-
ting him sit by his side as he conducted his presidency." Ander-
son credits Haig and Allen as having "dominated" foreign policy 
in the early Reagan Administration, but Bush, Meese, Deaver, 
and Baker served, he claims , as "powerful and effective" checks 
in the foreign policy domain. In fact, in 1981 Reagan declared 
that Bush was to be in charge of the Crisis Management Team 
(eventually renamed the Special Situations Group [SSG]). The 
SSG was an inter-departmental group responsible for emergency 
foreign policy coordination (Parmet , 2001 , 266). As will be ex-
plained below, the SSG and Bush's leadership of the group were 
important components in some of the Reagan Administration's 
more memorable crises. 
Bush also boosted his usefulness to the Reagan team by 
maintaining extra channels of communication between the Ad-
ministration and Congress. As a former member of the House of 
Representatives and as the President of the Senate, Bush worked 
hard and on the whole successfully to maintain positive relations 
with both houses of Congress. 18 
18 Reston , J . 1985. "The Quiet Survivo r," New York Times, 16 January, p. A-23 . Smith, 
H. 1981. "Bush says he Sought to Avoid Acting like Surrogate President ," New York 
Times, 12 April, pp. I .J:. 28. 
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ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT 
To better appreciate Vice President Bush 's activities in the 
Reagan White House and the actual working s of the semi-
institutional vice pre sidency, it is necessary to examine certain 
events and policy arenas. The first major event of the Reagan 
Administration, which helped solidify Bush 's place on the 
Reagan team, was the assassination attempt on President Reagan . 
Reagan and Bush had been in office less than three months 
when , on March 30, 1981, John Hinckley attempted to kill Presi-
dent Reagan on the streets of Washington , DC. After the shoot-
ing, the White House was enmeshed in chaos. Most of the 
Cabinet and top presidential aides were gathered in and around 
the White House Situation Room . At one point in the afternoon , 
Secretary of State Haig rushed up to the press room to answer 
questions from the med ia. A famou s video clip shows Haig stat-
ing that, "Constitutionally , gentleman , you have the President, 
the Vice President , and the Secretary of State , in that order . . . . As 
of now, I am in control here , in the White House , pending return 
of the Vice President " (Haig , 1984, 60). Media editing showed 
an out-of-breath Haig claiming "I am in control here." Fair or 
not, this did not help his standing in the press , nor within the 
Administration. 
In contrast to Haig , Vice President Bush exhibited measured 
poise, and made the most of this unexpected opportunity to fur-
ther endear himself to Reagan and the President's intimates. 
Upon reaching Andrews Air Force Base ju st outside of Washing-
ton, Bush was told that it would be quicker for him to take a 
helicopter directly to the White House . Bush 's handlers undoubt-
edly recognized that a South Lawn White House landing would 
make the Vice President look more presidential, but Bush de-
clined, retorting, "only the President lands on the South Lawn ." 
Similarly, in order to show that the government was operating 
without a glitch , a Cabinet meeting was held the next day chaired 
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by Bush, but he pointedly refused to sit in the President's chair. 
Symbolic actions perhaps, but Bush seemingly enhanced his 
standing within the Administration through such behavior. Even 
prior to the shooting, however, Bush was apparently ingratiating 
himself with the President; based on Presidential Daily Diaries 
from the first two weeks of February 1981, Bush spent more 
time in the presence of Reagan than did any other foreign policy 
official. 19 
THE SOVIET UNION 
From President Harry Truman in the 1940s, to President 
Reagan in the 1980s, no nation in the world received more atten-
tion in American foreign policy than the Soviet Union. As an 
advisor to the President, diplomat, and back-door political opera-
tor, Vice President Bush played important roles in the Reagan 
Administration's efforts to deal with America's major foe in the 
decades' long Cold War. Bush's loyalty to Reagan allowed the 
more moderate vice president to ably serve his conservative 
president in an area of foreign policy in which Reagan held 
strong convictions. 20 
19 Tabulations of minutes from February 2, 1981 through February 13, 1981 (Monday 
through Friday) show that Bush was at meetings, functions , or ceremonies with Reagan 
for a total of I , I 87 minutes . Others in foreign policy : R. Allen, NSA (876) ; A. Haig, 
Secretary of State (504); C . Weinberger , Secretary of Defense (493) ; W. Casey, Director 
of Central Intelligence (493) ; J. Kirkpatrick, UN Ambassador (121 ); and D. Jones , 
Chairman of the Joint Chief s of Staff (90) . In fact, Bush ' s time rivals that of Reagan ' s 
closest advisers : James Baker ( 1,619) ; Ed Meese (1,324) ; and Michael Deaver (955) . 
(Presidential Diary , Feb . 2 through Feb . 5, 1981, folder "The President's Daily Diary 
( 1/27/8 I -2/5/8 I]," Ronald Reagan Library ; Presidential Diary, Feb . 6 through Feb. I 3, 
198 I, folder "The President ' s Daily Diary [2/6/81-2/ 16/8 I) ," Ronald Reagan Library) . 1 
s tarted in February under the assumption that January 1981 would be filled with inaugu-
ral-related ceremonial activities . 
20 I con sulted many sources in attempting to understand the Reagan administration's 
approach to dealing with the Soviet Union and George Bush ' s role in that approach . The 
Reagan presidential biography by Cannon and the Bush biography by Parmet are useful , 
Note continues on next page . 
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Prior Republican administrations, led by Presidents Nixon 
and Ford and their foreign policy advisor Henry Kissinger, pre-
ferred the realist policy of detente; both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
could coexist peacefully through a balance of power and the use 
of treaties to maintain that balance. For Reagan, detente cast 
moral acceptance on communism and the "evil empire" of the 
Soviet Union; he also believed that treaties held limited value 
because the Soviets could cheat too easily. Instead, Reagan 
wanted the U.S. to build up its military defenses and approach 
negotiations with the Soviets from a position of strength; when 
the Soviets came to recognize that they could not keep up with 
the mighty capitalistic military build-up of America, they would 
be far more willing to enter into agreements that were more ad-
vantageous to the U.S., and less likely to cheat once they did so. 
Hence Reagan was not inherently opposed to entering into trea-
ties with the Soviets despite some of his rhetoric and conserva-
tive foreign policy outlook, a position that often annoyed the 
more conservative members in his Administration. 
In 1981, at the start of the Reagan Administration, the mili-
tary was accordingly infused with funding for Reagan's prom-
ised buildup. Within a few years, Reagan began to look for 
openings with which to approach the Soviets. With the help of 
Secretary of State George Shultz, and eventually Soviet General 
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan did find opportunities to 
build a less acrimonious U.S.-Soviet relationship. 21 Until Gorba-
chev became the Soviet leader, Bush played a diplomatic role by 
as is Don Oberdorfer 's The Tum (1992) and Raymond Garthoffs The Great Transition 
(I 994). The single best insider account of the Reagan administration's dealing with the 
Soviets comes from George Shultz's memoir , Turmoil and Triumph (1993). A more 
recent insider account has been written by Jack Matlock (2004) . 
21 According to Hedrick Smith (I 996, 72), Bush used one of his private weekly lunches 
with Reagan to urge him to "move quickly in 1985 toward a summit meeting with ... 
Gorbachev ." 
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traveling to the Soviet Union on many occasions, officially rep-
resenting the U.S. at the funerals of a string of General Secretar-
ies who died in rapid succession . From Brezhnev to Andropov to 
Chernenko to Gorbachev, Bush and Shultz were always on hand 
to get first impressions of new Soviet leaders. Both men were 
among the first to recognize that Gorbachev represented a new 
kind of Soviet leader (Garthoff, 1994, 207; Shultz, 1993, 527-
533) . 
The year 1983 proved to be a difficult and strained one for 
U.S.-Soviet relations , but one in which the Vice President was to 
have an impact. Shultz called 1983 "the year of the missile," and 
with good reason . As part of a compact between President Carter 
and allies in Europe , the United States had only a limited time to 
install Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missile s 
and cruise missiles on the European continent. This American 
action was in response to the growing number of intermediate 
range Soviet missiles (SS-20 missiles) in Eastern Europe that 
were pointed towards Western Europe. To make matters more 
difficult , the Reagan Administration had to deal with protests 
from the "freeze movement" at home in the United States and in 
Europe.22 
Both the Soviets and the United States placed offers on the 
table to deal with the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 
problem. The Soviets would reduce their INF missiles in return 
for a promise by the United States not to install its missile s in 
Europe (Garthoff, 1994, 134). The United States offered what 
was referred to as the "zero option ," which dictated that the U.S. 
would not emplace its missiles in Europe if the Soviets removed 
22 The freeze movement called for the unilateral freezing of nuclear missi le increases by 
the United States. It was hoped that such a stance would gam er a similar response from 
the Sovie t Union. For a thorough discussion of the freeze movement, see Wirls ( I 992, 
I 03-132). 
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their INF missiles. Both countries saw the other's offer as mak-
ing unilateral demands and, hence, as unacceptable. Given this 
stalemate and the pending missile deployment in Europe, the 
Soviets walked out of ongoing treaty talks with the Americans at 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
Vice President Bush was sent on a seven-nation European 
mission at the beginning of "the year of the missile." It was in-
tended to help contain the fears of the continent's populace, 
while bolstering the concerns of the various nations' leaders. 23 
Europeans were reassured that the missiles were to be deployed 
for peaceful purposes and reflected Reagan's belief that the So-
viets must be dealt with from positions of strength. Through the 
military buildup and European INF deployments, the U.S. was 
supposedly creating stronger bargaining positions. In this con-
text, Bush's diplomatic skills proved helpful to both American 
foreign policy and European leaders. According to the Washing-
ton Post, Bush "played the role of an effective public relations 
man for the Reagan Administration. In private, there is also rea-
son to believe that Bush handled himself well in his meetings 
with European leaders." 24 The Washington Post editorial board 
offered laudatory marks for Bush's European tour, claiming that 
"George Did lt." 25 The trip did not have a strategically substan-
tive purpose, but public relations and symbolism were important 
23 Bush referred to his task as a " two-track mission ." First, Bush was to meet with 
Europe 's leaders and inform them of the President ' s support and steadfastness in having 
the missiles deployed ; second , Bush needed to "stop Yuri V. Andropov , the Soviet 
leader, from ' running away with U1e ballgame ' in U1e heated public relations contest for 
the minds of the European audience " (Clines , F. X. 1983. "The Vice President: No Com-
ment on the Future ." New York Times, p. A-18) . 
24 Getler, M. 1983. "Bush a Hit in Europe" Now Does that Help?" Washington Post, 20 
February . Retrieved September 15, I 004 from LexisNexis . 
25 
"George Did It." 1983. Washington Post, 13 February . Retrieved September 15, 2004 
from LexisNexis. 
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factors in American foreign policy, particularly amidst U.S.-
Soviet tensions during 1983. 
On a second trip to Europe in 1983, Bush was able to open a 
"special channel" of communication with the Finnish govern-
ment (D. Gregg, personal communication, June 3, 2005). Bush's 
national security adviser, Donald Gregg, had contacts in the Fin-
nish government, and realized that they were well versed on So-
viet affairs. According to Gregg, the Finns informed him early on 
that Gorbachev was a star on the rise, and that if he became the 
Soviet leader, new opportunities would follow. When Bush met 
with Finnish President Mauno Koivisto, they both ensured that 
the channel between the Vice President's office and the Finnish 
President's office remained intact. As mentioned above, Bush 
later met Gorbachev at Soviet leader Chernenko's funeral. Gregg 
is convinced that Bush's ensuing report to Reagan regarding his 
meeting with Gorbachev was important to the opening of oppor-
tunities between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (after every such trip, 
Bush prepared a thorough report for the President). 
Bush also used his lunch meetings to help prod Reagan to-
wards a less confrontational posture after the downing of Korean 
Air Liner 007. Bush's efforts "resulted in a speech Reagan deliv-
ered at the White House ... in which he said 'we must and will 
engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as 
possible. '" 26 
Bush was also influential in dealing with Poland's relation-
ship with the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, the Solidarity 
26 Hoffman, D. I 986 . "Bush: Loyal Soldier Maneuvers in Private; Influenced President 
on Soviets but held back Deficit Warning ," Washington Post, 28 October. Retrieved June 
6, 2005 from LexisNexis . Bush dealt with the downing of KAL 007 in another capacity. 
As head of the Special Situations Group, he brought the SSG together and was able to 
acquire early pieces of data that were helpful to Shultz and others dealing with initial 
reports on the tragedy (Garthoff, 1994, 119). The most up-to-date resource on the tragedy 
is Murray Sayle's (1993) article for the New Yorker magazine . 
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union (led by Lech Walesa) was a constant burr in the side of the 
communist government. The Soviet leaders and Polish president 
Wojciech Jaruzelski decided to crack down on the Solidarity 
movement, and Vice President Bush took the lead in urging the 
President to adopt sanctions against both Poland and the USSR. 
Bush did this through the use of the Special Situations Group. 27 
When Shultz, who hoped to improve dialogue with the Soviet 
Union, became Secretary of State, he asked that an interdepart-
mental Saturday breakfast be established. For that, NSA 
Mcfarlane turned to his assistant for Soviet matters, Jack 
Matlock, to create the group that would have on-going and open 
discussions about Soviet foreign policy. Along with Weinberger, 
DCI Casey, Shultz, and their assistants, Bush "participated ac-
tively and usefully in many of the group's meetings" (Matlock, 
2004, 75). Moreover, Bush served a useful function in keeping 
Shultz plugged into the inner workings of the White House 
(Shultz, 1993 312,317,423). According to Bush's national se-
curity adviser, Donald Gregg (personal communication, June 3, 
2005), Gregg met regularly with a confidante of Secretary of 
State George Shultz, Charles Hill. Gregg felt that this was a 
valuable information resource for both Bush and Shultz. After 
each meeting Gregg reported everything to Bush. 28 
Throughout the remainder of the Reagan Administration, and 
with the rise to power of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gor-
bachev, the chances of confrontation with the U.S.S.R. and nu-
27 Weisman, S. R. I 982. '·Bush Prizes his Behmd-the-Scenes innuence," New York 
Times, 28 February, p. I+. 
28 Bush also worked with, and through, NSA McFarlane: "Early in 1984, when hard-line 
and more pragmatic factions in the Administration were at odds over what approach it 
should take, Mr. Bush worked with Robert C. McFarlane ... to move Mr. Reagan to a less 
hostile view of Moscow" (Boyd, G. M. 1987. "Issue for '88: Who is George Bush?" .Yew 
York Times, November 20. Retrieved February 11, 2004 from LexisNexis). There was a 
closeness between McFarlane and Bush that added lo Bush's ability to maintain a back-
channel innuence in foreign policy (Timberg, I 995, 369). 
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clear holocaust diminished greatly.29 There were still difficulties 
ahead for U.S. and Soviet negotiators. Reagan's insistence on 
moving forward with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 
which was supposed to provide a shield over the U.S. against 
nuclear attack, proved to be a difficult negotiating barrier be-
tween Reagan and Gorbachev. At the same time, SDI aligned 
perfectly with Reagan's detestation of nuclear weapons and his 
desire to see the world rid of them. During the second summit 
between Reagan and Gorbachev, in Reykjavik , Iceland in 1986, 
the superpowers came remarkably close to removing their entire 
nuclear arsenals , but Reagan's desire to maintain SDI prevented 
an agreement. Interestingly, although Bush did not care for the 
conservative hard-line of the first term, he also did not care for 
what he saw as excessive naivete in Reagan's willingness to deal 
away too many missiles: it seemed to him unlikely that the world 
could safely dismantle much of its nuclear stockpiles 
(Oberdorfer, 1992, 329). However, during his own presidency, 
Bush continued working on different variations of missile de-
fense.30 In any event, SDI was not an insurmountable issue; 
Reagan and Gorbachev came to important agreements on the 
reduction of nuclear forces toward the end of Reagan's second 
term. As vice president (and later as president), Bush played im-
portant parts as the United States saw one of its greatest foreign 
29 At around the time of Gorbachev 's rise to the office of General Secretary , Reagan was 
deciding to minimize the number of people he consulted with on US-Soviet foreign pol-
icy: " I would consult only with a small group-George Bush, George Shultz, Cap 
Weinberger, and Bud McFarlane ... in the National Security Planning Group to determine 
whether we could develop a long-range plan that offered the Russians a series of small 
steps, and showed that we were sincere about wanting to improve relations as a prelud e to 
a summit and hoped they were, too" (Reagan, 1990, 594-595) . 
30 Vice President Quayle's national security adviser , Carnes Lord, credited Quayle and 
his staff with effectively influencing Bush Administration policy on missile defense (C. 
Lord, personal communication, May 24, 2005) . 
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The 1,900 American military service members made fairly 
quick work of the island, though not without difficulties. Among 
the many problems U.S. forces encountered was faulty intelli-
gence about the enemy's defense preparedness. Also, there were 
poor communications among the various branches deployed on 
or around the island. When all the firing stopped, eighteen ser-
vice members were killed and the U.S . was triumphant (Rosati, 
2004, 72). Parmet (2001, 285) wrote that "Bush did not exactly 
'o rchestrate' the invasion ... but he certainly was at the heart of 
the planning operation .... More significantly for Bush in the long 
run was his ringside seat at the creation of the first significant 
combat deployment since Vietnam." 32 
The apparent success of the Grenada invasion could not have 
come at a more needed time for the Reagan Administration. As 
decisions for the invasion were being made, news arrived that a 
deployment of U.S. forces (mostly marines) in Lebanon suffered 
the loss of 241 men who were instantly killed when a terrorist 
drove a bomb-laden truck into their housing facility 
(Huchthausen, 2003, 59). American forces had been placed in 
Lebanon in August, 1982, in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion 
of southern Lebanon earlier in the year. A strong Syrian presence 
in the country, along with the multi-religious complexities exist-
ing in Beirut, added to the normally high tensions in the Middle 
Eastern region. With Beirut slipping into chaos, President 
Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz decided to intervene. A 
multi-national force, led by the United States, was deployed to 
32 For a brief analysis of the problems encountered by U.S. forces in Grenada, see Rosati 
(2004, 172); also see Huchthausen (2003, 65-85) . As for Bush 's role, Gerald Boyd of the 
New York Times wrote the following : "As chainnan of Mr. Reagan 's ' crisis management ' 
team , Mr. Bush played a far greater role in the invasion of Grenada in October 1983 than 
was publicly disclosed at the time . With the President in Augusta , Ga., Mr. Bush con-
vened a meeting of top-level officials, recommend ed the military action and then con-
veyed the proposal to Mr. Reagan, who concurred " (" Issue for '88: Who is George 
Bush?" New York Times, November 20. Retrieved February 11, 2004 from LexisNexis). 
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policy triumphs unfold: the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet 
Union" 
GRENADA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND OTHER EVENTS 
As chairman of the Special Situations Group, Bush played an 
important role in one of the Reagan Administration's early mili-
tary ventures, Grenada. A small Caribbean island nation, Gre-
nada expe1ienced two coups. A radically anti-American, pro-
Cuban government was the result. Also, almost 600 Amer ican 
citizens were on the island as students at a local medical school. 
At the time the decision was made for American forces to invade 
in October 1983, Reagan was on a golf trip in Augusta , Georgia . 
Bush convened the National Security Council and received word 
from the President to proceed with the invasion. According to 
Herbe11 Parmet (2001, 284), "Bush, never hesitant as other sen-
ior officials, then telephoned Noriega [leader of Panama] to ask 
Castro to abandon any idea of countering by sending in Cuban 
troops." 
31 There are many theories regarding the changing relationship between the United Slates 
and the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Many conservatives prefer to credit 
Reagan with maintaining a tough posture towards the Soviets: his military buildup forced 
the Soviets to the bargaining table (for examp le, see Schweizer, 1994, 2002). Others 
prefer to credit Gorbachev and the changing intellectual climate in the Soviet Union 
(English, 2000); also, Garthoff found Reagan's pronouncements and actions to be any-
thing but helpful in working with the Soviet Union, particularly when Gorbachev had to 
face the growing domestic problems in his country (Garthoff, 1994). Beth Fischer pointed 
out that Reagan's position changed dramatically from that of a tough and uncompro mis-
ing cold warrior, to a more congenially willing participant in negotiations (Fischer, 
1997). Jack Matlock, who worked in the Reagan Administration, found that the end of 
the Cold War was bigger than the two main players . Contrary to Fischer 's argument, 
Matlock claims that Reagan was always consistent, and unique, in his desire to work with 
the Soviets. Finally, Melvyn Leffler credits the Truman administration for instituting the 
tough policies necessary to confront the growing Soviet threat; subsequent administra-
tions followed Truman's lead (1992, 27-28; Leffler, 2004). 
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the region . As has often been the case in American national secu-
rity politics, the enti re Administration was not on the same page. 
Secretary of Defen se Casper Weinberger believed that American 
forces should not have been deployed to Lebanon (1990, 157-
158)." 
Bush's opinion on whether or not the United States shou ld 
have provided American troops to secure Lebanon remains a 
mystery; however, after the bombing of the marines ' barracks, 
Bush ardently supporte d pulling the U.S. forces out. Much to the 
consternation of Shultz, Bush actively lobbied the President. In 
fact, while the President was in California, "Vice President Bush, 
with Cap Weinberger at his side, convened a series of cris is-
management meetings out of which came decision s to move up 
and condense the schedule for departure of the marines with no 
compensating dep loyment. ... The vice president said that there is 
nothing more important than getting those marines out" (Shultz, 
1993, 230-231 ). This was certainly not a foreign policy victory 
for the United States, but Bush's role in the Lebanon-American 
forces pull-out was evident. 
Crises were not the only area of foreign policy involvement 
for George Bush. He also acted on foreign economic issues. For 
example, early in the first term, Bush was placed in charge of 
helping the President prepare for a western economic summit in 
Canada .34 In another area of importance for foreign economic 
33 Weinberger's beliefs as to when American soldie rs should be deployed abroad were 
better kno",n as the Weinberger Doctrine (which would become more well known as the 
Powell Doctrine, after Colin Powell) : ·'we should not commi t American troops to any 
situation unless objectives were so important to American interests that we had to fight, 
and that if those conditions were met, and all diplomatic efforts failed, then we had to 
commit, as a last resort, not just token forces to provide an American presence, but 
enough forces to win and win overw helmingly" (Weinberger, 1990, 159-160). For a 
helpful and concise review of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, see Rosati (2004, 188). 
34 Rosellini , L. 1981. "Working Profile : George Bush ; Behind the Scenes is Fine, he 
says," New York Times, 28 October, p. A-20. Smith, H. 1981. "Bush says he Sought to 
Note continues on next page . 
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policy, Japanese automotive imports, Bush offered to Reagan the 
idea that Japan "voluntarily" reduce their auto exports. Reagan 
liked the idea and had Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield 
suggest it to the Japanese government (Reagan, 1990, 254; 
Rosellini, 1981). After Reagan traveled to Japan in 1983, Bush 
was placed in charge of a task force to ensure that agreements 
between the two nations were carried out; in leading the task 
force, Bush dealt directly with Japan's Prime Minister Nakasone 
(Shultz, 1993, 190). 
Although Bush benefited from the semi-institutionalized vice 
presidency, he also made an important change to it: unlike Vice 
President Mondale, Bush did not refrain from specific assign-
ments. One such assignment was Bush's supervision of an anti-
terrorism task force. Unfortunately, as evidenced by future 
events like Iran-Contra, the recommendations based on Bush's 
work were not followed. 35 Bush also supervised the South Florida 
Task Force, which was formed in 1982 to address the increased 
amounts of marijuana and cocaine entering the U.S. Although 
Bush was able to bring together diverse elements of the U.S. bu-
reaucracy in the war on drugs, over time cocaine increasingly 
entered the country and became more affordable (Parmet, 2001, 
265; Rothenberg, 1988). Still, Bush made an important contribu-
tion to the precedents of the semi-institutional vice presidency by 
establishing that specific assignments need not hinder a vice 
president's general advisory ability. His successors, Quayle , 
Avoid Acting like a Surrogate President," New York Times, 12 April, pp. 1 & 28. Weis-
man, S. R. 1982. "Bush Prizes his Behind-the-Scenes Influence," New York Times, p. 1 +. 
35 One of the stronger statements from Bush's task force eerily foreshadowed the Reagan 
administration's biggest scandal: "The U.S. government will make no concessions to 
terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies, or agree to other 
acts which might encourage additional terrorism" (Parrnet, 200 I, 265). 
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Gore, and Cheney, took on specific, and sometimes vital, as-
signments. 36 
Clearly, Bush played an important diplomatic role for the 
Reagan Administration. He traveled 1.3 million miles as vice 
president and visited 74 countries. According to Kenneth Walsh 
(1988) of U. S. News & World Report, Bush familiarized himse lf 
with virtually every major head of state, ranging from Mikha il 
Gorbachev to China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaping .... Bush's 
closest friends in world capitals included Canada's Brian Mul-
roney, Britain's Margaret Thatcher and West Germany's Helmut 
Kohl, and he has a strong bond with France's Francois Mitter-
and. Without fanfare, Bush has hosted heads of state such as 
President Sese Seko Mobutu of Zaire and Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew of Singapore. 
CENTRAL AMERICAAND IRAN-CONT RA 
Ironically, the best place to uncover Vice President Bush's ac-
tive involvement in foreign policy is in the one area he would 
prefer no one looked: the Iran-Contra scandal. The largest presi-
dential controversy since Nixon's Watergate, Iran-Contra cap-
tured the nation's attention at a time when Bush least wanted the 
issue to bubble up in November 1986, since he was about to 
launch his second run for the presidency. Although the vice 
president's role in foreign policy has dramatically increase d, es-
pecially since Walter Mondale, the increased stature has not of-
ten translated into a promotion to the presidency. Not since 
Martin Van Buren in 1836 had a sitting vice president been 
36 For example , Gore 's national security adviser , Leon Fuerth, pointed out that Gore ' s 
leadership on four bi-national commissions with Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, and 
Egypt all produced positive results for the United States (L. Fuerth, personal communica-
tion, May 11, 2005). Also, Cheney was placed in charge of the G.W. Bush transition 
effort in 2000/2001 , and he was responsible for assessing the nation 's terrorism prepar-
edness prior to the 9/ l l attacks (Lechelt, 2004, 24, 26). 
TJIE JOURNAL OF PO LITI CAL SCl E N CE 
G. H. W. BUSH & THE INSTITUTIONAL VICE-PRESIDENCY 109 
elected president. 37 Bush did win the presidential election of 
1988, but Iran-Contra was certainly not a help to him. 
To better understand Bush's role in Iran-Contra and the scan-
dal, it is important to consider earlier, and related, issues. First 
and foremost there is Panama and its leader Manuel Noriega.38 
As vice president, Bush had minimal contact with Noriega, who 
took control of Panama in 1983. But in late 1983, while Bush 
was traveling to Argentina for the swearing in of a new presi-
dent, his national security advisor, Donald Gregg, and the soon-
to-be-infamous Oliver North, accompanied the Vice President as 
they stopped in Panama to tell Noriega to cease helping Salva-
doran death squads. The death squads were led by right-wing 
militants who were aggressively anti-communist. Of course, the 
vehement anti-communist position of the squads accommodated 
Reagan's own policy preferences, but it is difficult to argue for 
the human rights benefits of rejecting communism when those 
fighting communism are not respecting human rights. Hence the 
Bush warning to Noriega, one later made to leaders in El Salva-
dor as well (Parmet, 2001, 285-286).39 Gregg states that Bush 
37 In I 960 , Richard Nixon, as Eisenhower ' s vice president, ran for president and lost to 
John F. Kennedy; but Nixon was elected president in 1968. 
38 Bush 's connections to Noriega stretched back to 1976, when Bush was Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI) and learned that Noriega, then head of Panama's intelligence 
agency, was spying on Americans in Panama; the Americans were, in tum, spying on the 
Panamanian government (Engelberg , S. I 988 . "Bush and Noriega : Examination of Their 
Ties ," New York Times, 28 September . Retrieved February I I, I 004 from LexisNexis ). 
Central America, as with most regions of the world, was considered more important to 
American interests because of the Cold War. Communist forces were supposedly infil-
trating many countries in the region, and Noriega was then considered a friend in the 
ongoing Cold War chess game. With all of that in mind, DCI Bush was not eager to go 
afier Noriega for spying activities. 
39 Bush traveled to other Central and South American nations, always carrying the 
Reagan Doctrine message that "The United States believes in the self-determination of 
peoples .. . . It also believes in nonintervention. But it cannot and will not sit by while 
foreign powers-hostile to the principles we in the Americas have struggled so long 
for-intervene brutally :n the international affairs of one of our neighbors " (Parmet , 
Note continues on next page. 
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dealt "with death squads in El Salvador in just a tremendously 
powerful way ... calling the military leaders in and just absolutely 
berating them" (D. Gregg, personal communication, June 3, 
2005). Bush's impact on the situation in El Salvador appeared to 
pay off as the list of demands the Vice President gave to Salva-
doran leaders was mostly met by early January 1984: "a new 
military command was installed; some military officers who had 
been linked with death squads were transferred, allowing the 
authorities to get a grip on the free-lance vigilantes· and the army 
stood back and let the political process unfold" (Gutman, 1988, 
185).•0 
Eventually, the Reagan team recognized the difficulties of 
dealing with Noriega. Towards the end of the Administration, 
and with Bush fully engaged in 1988 campaign politics , the Vice 
President vehemently argued with President Reagan over the 
handling of the Panamanian leader. In February 1988, federal 
prosecutors indicted Noriega for his drug-smuggling activities. 
Reagan, however, was willing to compromise: if Noriega would 
resign his control over the Panamanian government and leave the 
country, President Reagan was willing to lift sanctions against 
Panama and waive indictments against Noriega. In the presence 
of other Administration officials, Bush spoke up against the 
President (Parmet, 2001, 332; Powell & Persico, 1995, 375). The 
deal was not carried out, and Bush would have to wait until he 
2001, 287). The Reagan Doctrine sought the "'rollback of Soviet influence in the third 
world"- particularly Central America, but also in Afghanistan (Gutman, 1988, 268). . 
40 Gregg (persona l communication , June 3, 2005) also pointed out that Bush's tough talk 
to the Salvadorans helped him in a second 1983 trip to Europe. The rise of El Salvado r on 
the U.S. agenda and the resulting media coverage of the death squads made European 
allies weary. Bush let the Europeans know that the U.S. was addressing the situation and 
would not tolerate death squads (Feldman , L. 1983. "B ush Defends Policy on Central 
America ," Christian Science Monitor . 28 June . Nordheimer , J. 1983. "Bush in London, 
Gives Latin Views ," New York Times, 25 June . Retrieved June 6, 2005 from LexisNexis) . 
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was president in order to see Noriega's forced removal from 
power. 
In hindsight, perhaps Bush should have argued similarly 
against the various issues that were labeled under the "Iran-
Contra" rubric. As for the Contra side of the scandal, Nicaragua 
was the focal point for the majority of the problems the United 
States faced in Central America during the Reagan years. At the 
end of the Carter presidency, the dictator of Nicaragua, General 
Anastasio Somoza, was overthrown by the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front led largely by Daniel Ortega. Ortega and the 
Sandinistas had leftist leanings that were further cemented when 
Ortega gained control of the Sandinistas and, hence, the new 
government. Although Carter made goodwill economic aid ges-
tures to the new government, Ortega embraced the Soviet Union. 
With the entrance of the Reagan Administration in January 1981, 
a more confrontational approach to the Sandinistas was adopted. 
Reagan wanted to repel the Sandinistas by funding counter-
revolutionaries (or "Contrarrevolucionarios," and their better-
known nomenclature, "Contras"). The Contras were a loose net-
work associated with the former Somoza regime and other fight-
ers who opposed the Sandinistas. The conservatives in the 
Reagan Administration admired the Contras and wanted to sup-
port their fight against the communist-leaning government 
(Draper, 1991, 15-16).41 
41 The Iran-Contra affair has generated no shortage of investigations. The most infom1a-
tive and thorough account of the entire affair is Theodore Draper's A Very Thin Line 
Draper, Theodore . (1991 .) . Another useful account that focuses on the Nicaragua aspect 
is Roy Gutman, .Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 
198/-/987 . New York: Simon and Schuster (1998). The United States Government, in 
many different capacities, thoroughly investigated the Iran-Contra affair. First, the 
Reagan administration appointed an in-house effort led by Attorney General Ed Meese . 
Then, realizing there was a larger public clamor for a more thorough investigation, the 
President appointed a commission led by former Senator John Tower (after whom the 
commission is more commonly known, the Tower Commission) . After that, the President 
Note continues on next page . 
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Interestingly , the "Contra" in the Iran-Contra affair actually 
preceded the Iran part of the scandal. The Iran-hostage aspect 
presented itself a bit later in the Reagan presidency (Draper, 
1991, 3). With the fall of the Shah of Iran during the Carter Ad-
ministration, the new radical rulers of the Muslim nation had 
established ties to other militant Muslim groups throughout the 
Middle Eastern region , and some of those groups dealt in terror-
ism. One such terrorist group, Hizballah , maintained operations 
in Lebanon and was responsible for the kidnapping of Americans 
working at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. One of those kidnapped 
was William A. Buckley, the CIA station chief in Lebanon, and 
this especially bothered Bush , who was a former CIA Director 
(Parmet, 2001, 305). 
As a means of getting the hostages released in Lebanon and 
making inroads with a supposed moderate element in Iran, a plan 
was devised of almost comical (and tragic) proportions. As with 
the Contra initiative, conservative elements working largely out 
of the National Security Council Staff and CIA believed that the 
hostages could be released if the Iranian government applied 
pressure to the Hizballah terrorists in Lebanon. Many believed 
that the most effective means of getting the Iranians to apply this 
pressure was by providing them with weapons for their ongoing 
war with Iraq. 
As mentioned above, the NSC Staff was the main coordinat-
ing arm of both aspects of Iran-Contra, with assistance from DCI 
William Casey. The two NSAs who were the main coordinators 
for the Iran and Contra initiatives were, first, Bud McFarlane , 
and then John Poindexter (who also served as McFarlane 's dep-
uty NSA). The man destined to rise as the focus of attention for 
appointed an independent counsel, Lawrence Walsh, to investigate whether or not any 
laws were broken . Finally, Congress also produc ed reports based on their invest igations : 
one for the majority Democrats , and one for the minority Republicans . 
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the Iran-Contra investigations was Lt. Col. Oliver North . He was 
the main point-man on the NSC staff for both the Iran and Con-
tra initiatives, and for the fateful linking of both aspects , which 
was the diversion of profits from the sale of arms to Iran to help 
the Contras in Nicaragua . Officially, North was the deputy direc-
tor for political-military affairs of the National Security Council 
staff; in actuality, North was the glue holding the scandal-to-be 
together, along with McFarlane and Poindexter. 
Aside from believing both approaches unwise , Secretary of 
State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger also feared 
that the initiatives might have been illegal. With regard to fund-
ing the Contras, legality was certainly in question : Congress had 
passed a few bills , all of which the President signed into law, 
containing restrictions on the flow of money to the Contras. De-
mocrats in Congress wanted the Administration to utilize diplo-
macy in dealing with Ortega and the Sandinista government. The 
Democrats feared that military force could slip out of control and 
engulf neighboring countries like Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Costa Rica. Also adding to frustrations in Congress was one par-
ticular semi-military operation led by the CIA, namely , the min-
ing of Nicaraguan harbors to prevent the flow of oil from 
benefiting the Sandinistas . Congress was outraged. Even staunch 
Republican Senator Barry Goldwater , chairman of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, was angry with the CIA (Gutman, 
1988). 
Because of the Congressional restrictions , North sought to 
continue funding the Contras by employing some imaginative 
schemes to maintain the money flow. First , he contacted other 
governments and asked them to help out. Saudi Arabia contrib-
uted $32 million and Taiwan another $2 million. Second , there 
were the contributions of private citizens, which came to $1.7 
million. Finally, proceeds from sales of arms to Iran were di-
verte d to the Contras (L. E. Walsh, 1994, 447) . 
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And so, in all of this, where was Vice President Bush? De-
pending on when the question was asked, his response almost 
literally varied from "everyw here" to "now here." In a Business 
Week interview held just a few months before the Iran initiative 
became a public controversy in November 1986, Bush claimed 
he was deeply involved in Administration policy: 'Tm in on eve-
rything. If our policies aren't working, I can't say, 'Wa it a min-
ute, I'm not to blame '" (1986). Even in his own diary regarding 
Iran-Contra, Bush claimed that he was "one of the few people 
that know fully the details" (L. E. Walsh, 1994, 480, fn 474). Yet 
in his autobiography (1988, 238), written after Iran-Contra was 
center-stage in public debate, Bush wrote that "I'd been deliber-
ately excluded from key meetings involving details of the Iran 
operation" and did not have a "rea l chance to see the picture as a 
whole" (see also Draper, 1993, 54). He also bluntly stated that he 
was "o ut of the loop" (Shultz, 1993, 809). 
In dealings with the Iranian initiative, Bush was present for 
practically every meeting of importance among Reagan's top 
national security advisors. This included the first meeting in 
1985 in which it was agreed that the United States was to replen-
ish Israeli missile stockpiles after Israel sold missiles to Iran. At 
another meeting on January 7, 1986, Shultz and Weinberger, two 
Administration officials who rarely agreed on anything, both 
stated quite clearly that they were opposed to the Iran initiative. 
George Bush was present for these important meetings, and al-
though his positions were not clearly stated, his silence was un-
derstood to mean agreement with the President's position of 
continuing arms-for-hostages efforts.42 Furthermore, according to 
42 Shultz stated that " it was clear to me ... that the President , the Vice President , the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Chief of Staff, the National Security 
Advisor all had one opinion and I had a di!Terent one and Cap shared it" (Tower , Muskie, 
& Scowcrofl, 1987, 225) . 
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Draper (1993, 54), "It is on record that Reagan, Bush, and the 
chief of staff met every morning at 9 AM, and Reagan, Bush, and 
the national security adviser met at 9:30 AM, whenever Bush 
was in Washington, which was most of the time. At these meet-
ings Reagan invariably brought up the hostages." 
Bush not only served as presidential confidante and advisor 
for Iran issues, he also acted as an ambassador on behalf of the 
policy. In fact, on one overseas trip, Bush met with a close advi-
sor to then-Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres in July 1986. 
Israel was in the middle of the arms for hostages swap in the 
early stages: Israel shipped its weapons to Iran, and the U.S. re-
stocked Israel 's missile supply. Amiram Nir was Israel 's go-to 
official for dealing with Iranian issues, and his official title was 
"Special Assistant on Counterterrorism " to the Prime Minister . 
The meeting was relatively brief and various accounts of its im-
portance exist in the public record. Bush (1988, 239-240) de-
scribed it as nothing more than a " listening session" on his part 
and felt that it only supplied "pieces" to a larger puzzle . Bush 's 
Chief of Staff, Craig Fuller, recorded however a far more de-
tailed briefing given by Nir. If Bush claimed to know little about 
the arms-for-hostages deal up until that meeting , he could hardly 
make that claim after the meeting. Nir laid it all out on the table 
by describing the logic of selling arms to Iran. As noted by 
Fuller, "the VP made no commitments nor did he give any direc-
tion to Nir" (Tower et al., 1987, 389). But Bush's report of the 
meeting helped the President decide to resume arms sales to Iran 
(L. E. Walsh, 1994, 480) . 
In November 1986, after the media got hold of the arms-for -
hostages story, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador 
to the United States, came to the White House to meet with 
Bush. Bandar was concerned that publication of the story was 
going to force U.S . policy to change regarding Iran; Bush as-
sured the Saudi ambassador that there would be no change . 
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Theodore Draper (1993, 56) noted that "if Bush took it upon 
himself to give such assurances to Bandar, he was clearly privy 
to all or at least enough of what had been going on in the Ad-
ministration's highest circles. In fact, it is significant that Bandar 
should have sought out Bush for an answer. " 
As Bush fulfilled important roles on the Middle East-
ern/Iranian side of the Iran-Contra scandal, he was also involved 
in supporting the Contras of Central America. First and foremost, 
Bush strongly favored the efforts made to acquire third party 
funding for the Contras, as long as no quid-pro-quo agreemertts 
were made for the funds. 43 Hence, although a complete and accu-
rate understanding of the Iran-Contra scandal may never be 
known , there is no mistaking that George Bush was a major part 
of this foreign policy fiasco. 44 
"' Also, two members of Bush 's staff-national security advisor Donald Gregg and dep-
uty national security advisor Col. Samuel J. Watson 111--played significant roles, again 
providing evidence of Bush 's impact on Reagan 's foreign polic y. Gregg and Watson 
were closely connected with the Contra activities through their contact, Felix Rodriguez . 
Rodriguez 's main role in the Contra supply effort was his work with the Salvadora n Air 
Force . After a Contra-re-supply plane was shot down in Cen tral America with an Ameri-
can on board , the U.S. media found out that the night was sponsored by the C IA, with 
Rodrigue z providing another link between shady activities and the upper-echelons of the 
White House (Walsh, 1994, 485). 
44MmTay Waas and Craig Unger (1992) wrote of a Bush-Casey connection that has re-
ceived scant attention elsewhere . During the 1980s, while the arms-for-hostages affair 
was ongoing, Iran was engaged in a lengthy eight-year war with Iraq, a nation then ruled 
by Saddam Hussein . According to Waas and Unger, Bush was part of a Casey-devised 
plan to continually balance the abilities of Iran and Iraq against each other on the theory 
that those two countries could best be occupied by a lengthy war between them. Accord -
ing to Waas and Unger, Bush was able to balance the factions within the Reaga n Admini-
stration, one of which favored Iraq, the other favoring Iran. If Waas and Unger are 
accurate , and they term the affair " Iragqate ," Bush played a very important role in bol-
stering Iraq against Iran. 
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CONCLUSION 
Vice President George Bush was an active and influential 
force on Reagan's foreign policy team. As a presidential advisor, 
Congressional liaison, diplomat-at-large, and as a leader of cer-
tain specific tasks and responsibilities such as the Special Situa-
tions Group, Bush took part in all of the major foreign policy 
issues of the Reagan Administration. Bush was able to do this in 
part because of his competence and the wishes of his President , 
but also because of the semi-institutionalization of the vice presi-
dency. It was President Carter and Vice President Mondale who 
together established a variety of precedents augmenting the 
prominence , power and resources of vice presidents . Those 
precedents included a vice presidential office in the West Wing, 
weekly private lunches between the president and vice president , 
inclusion of the vice president in the paperwork loop, the free-
dom of the vice president or a member of his staff to attend vir-
tually all presidential and national security meetings , and the 
continuance of a substantive budget line-item and staff resource s 
for the office. President Reagan and Vice President Bush main-
tained those precedents. In fact, Bush added a precedent of his 
own: he proved that a vice president could take on specific and 
important assignments without diminishing his general advisory 
status or influence. The precedents established by Carter/Mondale, 
and reinforced by Reagan/Bush, have persisted through to the 
current day. 
The vice presidency is a unique office, as are the individuals 
who fill it. Although the office has increased resources , it does 
not come close to what Cabinet Secretaries possess. Further-
more, there are few legal guidelines dictating how the vice presi-
dency should be utilized. But as with important increases in 
presidential power, precedents have filled in where the law has 
been silent. In The Imperial Presidency, Arthur Schlessinger 
(1973) pointed out that the power relationship between the presi-
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dent and Congress has shifted back and forth over the years, with 
the presidency making net gains overall. Likewise, the semi-
institutional vice presidency recognizes that every vice president 
will not have the same influence as Mondale or Bush: some will 
have more and others will have less. Presidents have options in 
determining how they will use their vice presidents, and vice 
presidents will at times help or hinder their standing within an 
administration. However, the pre-Mondale vice president will 
now be the exception, rather than the rule. 
REFERENCES 
2004. A Talk with George Bush: His Job ls 'a Tremendous Ad-
vantage' Aug. 18 1986 [cited August 6 2004]. Availab le 
from LexisNexis . 
Anderson , Martin. 1988. Revolution. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich1 
Bush, George & Victor Gould. 1988. Looking Forward. New 
York: Bantam Books. 
Cannon, Lou. 2000. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. 
New York: Public Affairs. 
Carter, Jimmy. 1982. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President . 
New York: Bantam Books. 
David, Paul T. 1967. "The Vice Presidency: Its Institutional Evo-
lution and Contemporary Status." Journal of Politics 29 
(4):721-48. 
Deaver, Michael K. 1987. Behind the Scenes. New York: Mor-
row. 
Draper, Theodore. 1991. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Af 
fairs. New York: Hill and Wang. 
Draper, Theodore. 1993. "Iran-Contra: The Mystery Solved ." 
New York Review of Books, June 10, 53-59. 
TIJE JOURNAL 01: POLITICAL SCIEN CE 
G. H. W. BUSH & THE INSTIT UTIONAL VICE-PRE SIDEN CY 119 
English, Robert D. 2000. Russia and the Idea of the West : Gor-
bachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Fischer, Beth A. 1997. The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy 
and the End of the Cold War. Columbia, MO: University 
of Missouri Press. 
Garthoff, Raymond L. 1994. The Great Transition: American-
Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. Washing-
ton: Brookings. 
Goldstein, Joel K. 1995. "The New Constitutional Vice Presi-
dent." Wake Forest Law Review 30:505-561 . 
Gutman , Roy . 1988. Banana Diplomacy: The Making of Ameri-
can Policy in Nicaragua, 1981-1987. New York: Simon 
and Schuster. 
Haig , Alexander M. 1984. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and For-
eign Policy . New York: Macmillan. 
Huchthausen, Peter. 2003. America 's Splendid Little Wars: A 
Short History of US Engagements from the Fall of Sai-
gon to Baghdad . New York: Penguin. 
Lechelt, Jack. 2004. "The Ascendancy of Vice President Dick 
Cheney." In Striking First: The Preventive War Doctrine 
and the Reshaping of US Foreign Policy, edited by B. 
Glad and C. J. Dolan. New York : Palgrave Macmillan. 
Leffler, Melvyn P. 1992. A Preponderance of Power: National 
Security, the Truman Administration , and the Cold War. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press . 
Leffler, Melvyn P. 2004 . Think Again: Bush's Foreign Policy . 
Foreign Policy, September/October, 22-28. 
Manning, Bayless. 1977. "The Congress , the Executive and In-
termestic Affairs: Three Proposals. " Foreign Affairs 55 
(2) :306-324. 
VOL. 33 2005 
120 LECHELT 
Matlock, Jack F. 2004. Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold 
War Ended. New York: Random House. 
Morris, Edmund. 1999. Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan. 
New York: Modem Library. 
Morse, Edward L. 1970. "The Transformation of Foreign Poli-
cies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externaliza -
tion." World Politics 22:371-392. 
Oberdorfer, Don. 1992. The Turn: From the Cold War to a New 
Era; the United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1990. 
New York: Touchstone. 
Parmet, Herbert S. 2001. George Bush: The Life of a Lonestar 
Yankee. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Powell, Colin, and Joseph E. Persico. 1995. My American Jour-
ney. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Ragsdale, Lyn, and John J. Theis, III. 1997. "The Institutionali-
zation of the American Presidency: 1924-92." American 
Journal of Political Science 41 (4): 1280-1318. 
Reagan, Ronald. 1990. An American Life. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Rosati, Jere! A. 2004. The Politics of United States Foreign Pol-
icy. 3 ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Leaming . 
Rosellini, Lynn. 1981. "Working Profile: George Bush; Behind 
the Scenes Is Fine, He Says." New York Times, Oct. 28, 
A20. 
Rothenberg, Randall. 2004. In Search of George Bush (Late City 
Final) [LexisNexis]. LexisNexis, Mar. 6 1988 [ cited 
February 11 2004]. Available from LexisNexis. 
Sayle, Murray. 1993. "A Reporter at Large: Closing the File on 
Flight 007." New Yorker, Dec. 13, 90-101. 
Schelisinger, Arthur M., Jr. 1973. The Imperial Presidency. Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
T HE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIEN CE 
G. H. W. BUSH & THE INSTITUTIONAL VICE-PRESIDENCY 121 
Schweizer, Peter. 1994. Victory: The Reagan Administration's 
Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. 
Schweizer, Peter. 2002. Reagan's War: The Epic Story of His 
Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Commu-
nism. New York: Doubleday. 
Shultz, George P. 1993. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Sec-
retary of State. New York: Scribner's. 
Smith, Hedrick. 1981. "Bush Says He Sought to Avoid Acting 
Like Surrogate President." New York Times, Apr. 12, 1, 
28. 
Smith, Hedrick. 1996. The Power Game: How Washington 
Really Works. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Sunstein, Cass R. "1995. An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a 
Twenty-First Century World ." Arkansas Law Review 48 
(1):1-21. 
Timberg, Robert. 1995. The Nightingale's Song. New York: 
Touchstone. 
Tower, John, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft. 1987. The 
Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the Presi-
dent's Special Review Board. New York: Banton and 
Times Books. 
Untermeyer, Chase. 1997. "Looking Forward: George Bush as 
Vice President." In At the President's Side: The Vice 
Presidency in the Twentieth Century, edited by T. 
Walch. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press. 
Waas, Murray, and Craig Unger. 1992. "Annals of Government: 
In the Loop: Bush's Secret Mission." New Yorker, 64-
83. 
Walsh, Kenneth T. 2004. Bush 's World of Power People Dec. 12 
1988 [cited February 11 2004]. Available from InfoTrac 
OnFile. 
VOL. 33 2005 
122 LECHELT 
Walsh, Lawrence E., and United States . Office of Independent 
Counsel. 1994. Iran-Contra : The Final Report. New 
York: Random House. 
Weinberger. 1990. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in 
the Pentagon. New York: Warner Books. 
Wirls, Daniel. 1992. Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the 
Reagan Era. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
